

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

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15 JAN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Francis A. Bausch  
Director, Policy Guidance Office  
Resource Management Staff

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Input to the DCI's Annual Report

REFERENCE: Your memo to me dtd 16 Oct 78,  
(DCI/ICS 78-1193); same subject

Attached, in further response to referenced memorandum, is a catalogue of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information which were reported to the DCI Security Committee during 1978, together with accompanying introductory notes. This is for use in responding to the request for such from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

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for Robert W. Gambino

Attachment

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Catalogue of Unauthorized Disclosures of Intelligence  
During 1978 [redacted]

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The attachment lists unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information brought to the attention of the DCI Security Committee during calendar year 1978. Of the 25 disclosures reported, 23 were in the press (domestic and foreign newspapers, and magazines or trade journals). One occurred during a television newscast, and one resulted from espionage (the Kampiles case). The sensitivity of the information involved ranged from Confidential to Top Secret codeword. Damage resulting from the disclosures ranged over a correspondingly broad spectrum. [redacted]

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Not listed are presumed but unconfirmed disclosures. A good example is the case of a journalist who, during an address to a seminar in November 1978, said that he possessed a "print-out" classified Top Secret codeword and bearing on intelligence satellite operations. Since that journalist has previously published material on highly sensitive intelligence activities, he may have obtained an official document satisfying that description. Without more specific information, there is little likelihood of being able to investigate such an incident. [redacted]

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With the exception of the Kampiles case, action on the listed disclosures did not result in identification of those who compromised the information. The difficulty in securing necessary approval for FBI investigations, and the time lapse that usually results from the date of a disclosure to the initiation of an investigation, coupled with the broad dissemination of much intelligence information, combine to frustrate the task of finding "culprits." A number of actions, both prophylactic and educational, have been taken to try to improve the situation.

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Firm and prompt legal action in cases of espionage, together with reasonably severe sentences for those convicted, may help deter others tempted to break our laws. Vigorous legal action taken in the Frank Sneed case should give pause to former intelligence officials considering violation of their secrecy agreements. Continuing steps to screen widely disseminated intelligence products so as to sanitize or delete sensitive source and method information minimizes damage when an unauthorized disclosure does occur. Security education programs are being improved and intensified so as to heighten consciousness of the need to safeguard sensitive information, and to provide guidance on how to do so. The Kampiles case prompted a complete review of CIA security procedures to see how well they were being applied, whether they were mutually supportive, and what contribution they were in fact making to sound security. Much remains to be done, however, particularly with regard to procedures for investigating disclosures and to better statutory protection for intelligence sources and methods.

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